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It is very plausible to think that the pair set {Socrates, Plato} is somehow
generated from Socrates and Plato; that table salt is made up of sodium and
chloride; that my head, torso, arms, and legs collectively constitute me; and
that the fact that it is both cloudy and chilly is grounded (collectively) in the
fact that it is cloudy and the fact that it is chilly. In each case, it seems that
something is somehow determined to be or to be the case by some things that
make it up, generate, ground, or constitute it.
More generally, philosophers are often moved to consider the question of
what “makes up” a certain phenomenon; what “gives rise to”, or “generates”
it; what its “source” or “basis” might be; or how it is “constituted” or “con-
structed.” A number of questions immediately arise, concerning this family of
relations. Which relations does it include? What does it take in general for a
relation to be included? Is there anything interesting that all members of the
family have in common? Karen Bennett’s book attempts to answer these ques-
tions. She calls the family of relations the building relations. This book offers
the rudiments of a theory of building relations. In particular, Bennett argues
that the class is unified, proposes necessary and sufficient conditions for mem-
bership in the class, and applies the resulting account to analyze philosophically
important notions of fundamentality. The result is an interesting and important
defense and development of a distinctive constellation of intricately connected
views on some central issues in metaphysics.
Over the course of eight chapters, Bennett argues for seven interesting theses
concerning building: (i) there is something important that unifies the class of
building relations, so that they form a “reasonably natural” resemblance class;
(ii) there is no generic building relation that obtains whenever any more specific
1
building relations obtain; (iii) causation should be included in the class of build-
ing relations; (iv) being fundamental in the sense of interest to philosophers is
just being unbuilt ;1 (v) being more fundamental than something, in the sense
of interest to philosophers, is analyzable by appeal to patterns of building re-
lations; (vi) instances of building relations are themselves built; and (vii) some
things are built, and so not everything is fundamental.
Bennett provisionally takes building relations to include certain relations
that will be relatively familiar to contemporary metaphysicians and philosophers
of mind: composition (between parts and wholes), constitution, set formation,
realization (of one property or property-instance by another), “microbased de-
termination” (of the properties of a whole by the properties of its parts), and
grounding (of one fact by another) (8-12). This seems like a pretty varied bunch
of relations. What, if anything, unifies it? Bennett offers two answers (31-2)
which, she thinks, establish that the building relations form a “reasonably nat-
ural” resemblance class.
First, she argues, the family of building relations can be helpfully character-
ized:
BUILDING A relation R is a building relation iff:
1. R is directed : it is irreflexive and antisymmetric;
2. R is necessitating : if Rxy, then there are circumstances C such that,
necessarily, if x obtains (or: exists, occurs, etc.) and C obtains, then
y obtains; and
3. R is generative: if Rxy, then the fact that Rxy makes ‘y obtains in
virtue of x’s obtaining’ true (32, 60).
Proposing necessary and sufficient conditions for almost any phenomenon of
interest is a perilous business, and readers will find many places to quibble.
For instance, the claim that building relations are necessitating is obviously
trivializable unless some restriction is imposed on C. (Let C be the fact that
y obtains.) Bennett suggests for this purpose that C may not include either y
1Thesis (iv) may seem to be at odds with thesis (ii). The appearance of tension is an
artifact of my simplified presentation. Bennett holds that there are as many dimensions of
fundamentality as there are building relations, and being fundamental along a given dimension
is being unbuilt by the corresponding building relation. Thus, on Bennett’s view, the question
of whether I am fundamental (full stop) is misconceived. I am fundamental along the dimen-
sion of fundamentality corresponding to set formation by dint of having no members. But I
am non-fundamental along the dimension corresponding to mereological composition.
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or anything that builds y (52). Two remarks are in order. First, the notion
of inclusion is somewhat obscure. So, for instance, it is not clear whether y
is included in the fact that y obtains and snow is white; nor whether it is
included in the fact that snow is not purple and (either y obtains or snow is
purple); nor whether it is included in the fact that Napoleon recognized that
y obtains. The second remark is that imposing this restriction on C renders
building unfit as a definition or reductive analysis of building, since the notion
of building is itself used on the right-hand side. It is not clear that Bennett
intends to be providing a reductive analysis. She does take the condition to be
informative and to specify in general what makes a given relation R a building
relation (when it is) (63). But, though the account carries a whiff of circularity,
there is no conclusive reason to think that the fact that Bennett’s specification
mentions building relations renders it problematically circular. The fact that
building relations must be mentioned certainly does not make Bennett’s account
uninformative.
In fact, far from thinking the condition uninformative, readers may have
grave doubts about its truth. Bennett discusses doubts already in the literature
about whether directedness or necessitation are necessary conditions for R to
be a building relation (32-57). But there are doubts about the sufficiency of the
right-hand side of building, too. building entails that any relation defined as a
restriction of a building relation is also a building relation. So, for instance, if we
suppose that R is directed, necessitating, and generative, so too is the relation
that obtains between x and y iff Rxy and y is beloved of the Pope. Similarly, the
relation that obtains between x and y iff Rxy and y is not beloved of the Pope
is a building relation. It is easy to see that these examples can be multiplied.
Bennett’s view, then, appears to entail that, as various, intuitively irrelevant
conditions come to obtain – as the Pope comes to love new things, for instance
– things get built in a large number of new ways, and cease to be built in a
large number of old ways. This is not particularly plausible; more importantly
in the present context, it is not clear that the class of relations delineated by
Bennett’s proposed condition is particularly natural.
The underlying problem can be illustrated using examples of relations whose
specifications do not mention any building relation. Suppose that, as matters
actually stand right now, the Pope’s favorite compound is the Vatican, and his
first n favorite buildings are the Sistine Chapel, St. Peter’s, etc. The Vatican
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is composed of those n buildings. Let’s suppose that composition relations
satisfy directedness, necessitation, and generativity. Then the relation that
obtains between the x’s and y iff the x’s are actually now the Pope’s favorite
n buildings, and y is actually now the Pope’s favorite compound qualifies as a
building relation (with just one instance, eternally and necessarily).2
In fact, just about any class of instances of members of a given class of build-
ing relations will yield a relation that satisfies the right-hand side of building.3
Given a class of instances, there is a relation R that obtains between x and y iff
〈x, y〉 is in the class. That relation R will satisfy the right-hand side of building
in most cases. So, given a class of building relations, each of which has some
instances, it is easy to come up with “gerrymandered” relations that satisfy the
right-hand side of building.4 It is not clear that a class that contains the
varied multitude of these relations is a fairly natural resemblance class. Perhaps
Bennett can patch the account by offering some further necessary condition for
something to be a building relation. As matters stand, however, the right-hand
side of building seems to be too weak.
The argument we have just sketched for the conclusion that the right-hand
side of building is too weak is significant in the context of Bennett’s argument.
The sufficiency of the right-hand side for a relation to qualify as a building re-
lation is the key premise in Bennett’s argument for one of her more surprising
main theses: that causation is a building relation (69).5 Bennett considers
2Bennett might resist this conclusion on the basis of the fact that the instance of this
relation doesn’t “license” any “in virtue of” claim, since noting the instance would not meet
the epistemic or pragmatic constraints on “in virtue of” explanations; sometimes she herself
characterizes generativity by appeal to the idea of “licensing” explanations (58, 62), and
sometimes she does not (see (G), p. 58). But this avenue of resistance would commit Bennett
to the idea that such epistemic or pragmatic constraints are part of what makes something a
building relation, a claim she clearly rejects (61-2).
3Not every class of instances is guaranteed to do the trick. If there are x and y and building
relations R and S such that Rxy and Syx, then picking the instance 〈x, y〉 of R and 〈y, x〉 of
S will not yield a directed relation. Bennett thinks we ought to allow that this sort of case,
in which different building relations obtain in different directions, may occur (26-9).
4The problem I am alleging is not that the relations themselves are gerrymandered; the
problem, rather, is that they don’t seem, as a class, to be particularly unified, or to have much
in common. I highlight the fact that one can come up with gerrymandered relations satisfying
the right-hand side of building only to demonstrate how many and how varied they are.
5Because the appropriate restriction on C in the statement of clause (2.) of building is
not made clear, it is not obvious that causation qualifies as a necessitating relation. However,
Bennett clearly thinks causation satisfies the right-hand side of building. So, a charitable
interpretation of clause (2.) of building will require that whatever restriction we eventually
place on C will classify causation as necessitating (cf. 80-1). The claim that causation is a
building relation is surprising because, on Bennett’s view, it entails the unexpected result that
causes are more fundamental along a certain dimension than their effects. So, for instance, if
my decision to drive to New Hampshire causes some hydrocarbon chains to undergo combus-
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in depth the question of whether building is objectionable because it classifies
causation as a building relation. Ultimately, though she contends that causa-
tion is a building relation, she is happy to entertain views on which we amend
building or related theses specifically to exclude causation (169). She argues,
however, that causation is relevantly similar to grounding, composition, and
the other building relations because those other relations are, in her apt phrase,
causally “tainted.” Some instances of these relations (she explicitly excludes
set-formation) obtain in virtue of diachronic, causal relations. So, for instance,
she contends that the made from relation that obtains, e.g., between a cake and
the flour, eggs, butter, and sugar from which it is made is a building relation,
and that this relation obtains partly in virtue of causal relations between the
ingredients and the cake (89-90). She also contends that the composition of an
ordinary material object by its particles, and the grounding, microbasing, or
realization of that objects’ features in features of those particles are examples
of building. Moreover, in typical cases the particles compose the object partly
in virtue of a complex network of causal interactions. Those causal interactions
are also among the conditions in virtue of which the object has its solidity, mass,
color, etc.
So, Bennett argues, causation is similar to other building relations, in part
because they themselves are causally “tainted”: they relate causal conditions,
and sometimes obtain in virtue of causal conditions. She concludes that exclud-
ing causation and other causally “tainted” relations from the class of building
relations yields a class that “... includes set formation, but does not include
realization .... It includes the relation between [some] Legos and the castle [they
compose], but not that between the ingredients and the cake. It includes some
but not all instances of grounding, composition, and microbasing” (100). The
resulting class of relations “...fails to carve reality at the joints” (100). Thus,
whether we call causation a building relation or not, the class which contains
both causation and the (other) building relations is fairly natural, and the class
which excludes both causation and the other causally “tainted” building rela-
tions is not natural.
Readers may dispute Bennett’s examples. But her claim that there are
building relations that are at least sometimes instantiated diachronically, have
tion, then that decision is more fundamental than the combustion, along a certain dimension
of fundamentality.
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causal relata, and obtain in virtue of causal conditions is highly plausible. Still,
it is not clear that her argument succeeds. The problem is that a given relation
can, in certain instances, have causal relata and even obtain sometimes in virtue
of causal relations, without itself being causally “tainted” in a way that seems
to bear on the question of whether it is relevantly similar to causation. So, for
instance, it is plausible to think that the fact that the ignition of a fuse caused
an explosion grounds the fact that either the ignition caused the explosion or
snow is purple. And, on a plausible view about what it is in virtue of which
this grounding fact obtains, grounding relates the two facts in virtue of the
fact that the ignition caused the explosion. (The view in question is discussed
and defended in Ch. 7.) Still, intuitively, these claims don’t seem to provide
reason on their own to conclude that the grounding relation itself is causally
“tainted” in a way that makes it relevantly similar to causation, or that shows
that the class which includes causation and the other building relations is a
relatively natural resemblance class. If this argument establishes that grounding
is causally “tainted,” then exactly similar arguments show that grounding is
“tainted” by a very large class of relations. So, for instance, there is a similar
argument for the claim that grounding is mathematically “tainted”, on the basis
of the premise that the fact that 2+3 = 5 grounds the fact that either 2+3 = 5
or snow is purple. We shouldn’t conclude on this basis that the class of relations
which includes the mathematical relations and the building relations, but not,
e.g., the causal relations, is a fairly natural resemblance class.
So far, we have been discussing Bennett’s first reason for thinking that the
class of building relations is unified: there is, she argues, a relatively simple
and informative necessary and sufficient condition for membership in the class.
Bennett’s second reason is that the notion of a building relation can be used to
offer a reductive account of the kind of fundamentality at issue in metaphysics,
ethics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science.6 Dualists in the philos-
ophy of mind, for instance, contend that certain psychological phenomena are
fundamental; meta-ethical naturalists hold that moral properties are not fun-
damental; and nowadays most of us think that biological phenomena are less
fundamental than physical phenomena. Bennett contends that we can offer a
6This is a little misleading. As I emphasized in n. 1 above, Bennett’s view is that there are
multiple kinds of fundamentality at issue, one for each building relation. Each such kind is
used to analyze fundamentality along a corresponding dimension. So, causation is a building
relation, and is used by Bennett to analyze causal fundamentality. Composition is also a
building relation, and is used by Bennett to analyze mereological fundamentality.
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reductive analysis in terms of building of both being fundamental (full stop) and
being more fundamental than something. The fact that the notion of building
plays this robust theoretical role, Bennett argues, is a symptom that building
relations form a natural resemblance class.
Let’s focus on Bennett’s account of relative fundamentality, the relation that
obtains between entities x and y when x is more fundamental than y. It might
seem as if an analysis of relative fundamentality in terms of building is ready to
hand: just say that x is more fundamental than y iff x builds y. Bennett regards
this simple proposal as implausible, since it entails that there is no relation of
relative fundamentality between entities that are not related by building. For
instance, the simple proposal entails that a hydrogen atom in Phoenix is no
more fundamental than a water molecule in Ithaca; but the hydrogen atom,
Bennett thinks, clearly is more fundamental. What the simple account seems
to miss is that one individual can be less fundamental than another by virtue
of belonging to a kind which (typically) is built from members of some kind
to which the less fundamental thing belongs. The Ithacan water molecule and
Phoenician hydrogen atom belong to the kinds water molecules and hydrogen
atoms, respectively. Entities of the former kind are typically (in fact, invariably)
built from entities of the latter kind. For this reason, it is plausible to think
that the Ithacan water molecule is less fundamental (138, 158).
This intuition is part of what drives Bennett to propose a more complicated
analysis of relative fundamentality in terms of building. On this analysis, there
are five conditions that are individually sufficient and jointly necessary for rel-
ative fundamentality. For the sake of brevity, I will explicitly discuss only the
fifth condition, which is the one which is supposed to capture the key intuition:7
(5) If x belongs to some kind K and y belongs to some kind K∗ such that
i. neither K nor K∗ includes both built and unbuilt members;
ii. y does not belong to K and x does not belong to K∗, and
iii. K∗’s are typically or normally built from K’s,
then x is more fundamental than y.
7The condition (5) is intended by Bennett to be schematic over the various dimensions of
building; see n. 1. So, we get a sufficient condition for relative fundamentality with respect
to composition by substituting “composed” for “built”, and, similarly, for cognate locutions.
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Unfortunately, this clause will not serve Bennett’s purposes. The problem is
that an individual is a member of many different kinds, and pairs of individuals
can be members of pairs of kinds that yield untoward results. Consider, for
instance, a disjunctive, psychological fact dp and a non-disjunctive, economic
fact ne. Let K be the kind psychological facts and K∗ be the kind economic
facts. Both kinds, I assume, include only built (in this case, grounded) members.
Assuming that ne is not identical with any psychological fact and dp is not
identical with any economic fact, each belongs to only one of K and K∗. Finally,
economic facts are, plausibly, typically grounded in psychological facts. So, K
and K∗ witness each of (i.)-(iii.), and thus (5) counts dp as more fundamental
than ne. Now let K be the kind grounded, non-disjunctive facts, and K∗ the kind
disjunctive facts. Again, plausibly, each of (i.)-(iii.) is satisfied,8 so (5) counts
ne as more fundamental than dp. But relative fundamentality is asymmetric, so
the analysis is in trouble. This case involves grounding, but similar cases can be
concocted for composition. So, consider a five-gram mass of table salt (NaCl) in
Ithaca and a ten-gram mass of sodium (Na) in Phoenix. Table salt is typically
composed (in part) of sodium, and ten-gram masses are typically composed (in
part) of five-gram masses. Again, (5) entails that the five grams of table salt
are both more fundamental than and less fundamental than the ten grams of
sodium.
Bennett acknowledges that her complicated criterion for relative fundamen-
tality is likely to face counter-examples.
One can always fight about the details. Complicated, multi-clause
definitions beg to be counterexampled, after all. Perhaps clause
(5) requires some further tinkering; perhaps there needs to be an
additional clause. I do think this definition is, at a minimum, on the
right track (161).9
The phenomenon that causes trouble for (5) is common enough, however, that
mere tinkering, adding further qualifications and conditions, is unlikely to yield
satisfactory results.
So, I suspect, nothing like (5) is correct. What’s gone wrong? It seems to
8Here I assume that disjunctive facts are normally grounded in facts that are themselves
grounded; if that assumption turns out to be objectionable, we could alter the case so that
the kind K we are considering is grounded, non-disjunctive facts and K∗ is disjunctive,
psychological facts. Thanks to Justin Zylstra for discussion on this point.
9I owe thanks to Bennett for drawing my attention to this passage.
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me that the original intuition concerning the Ithacan water molecule and the
Phoenician hydrogen atom is based on a mistake. There are relative fundamen-
tality relations among kinds: water is less fundamental than hydrogen, economic
facts are less fundamental than psychological facts, and table salt is less funda-
mental than sodium. It is tempting to “push down” the relation on kinds to
a relative fundamentality relation on their members, as Bennett proposes. But
the argument of the previous paragraphs suggests that this temptation should
be resisted. It would be better, then, to stick with the simple account of rela-
tive fundamentality among individuals. On this view, the Phoenician hydrogen
atom is not more fundamental than the Ithacan water molecule. We may still
salvage what we can of Bennett’s intuition by offering a separate account – per-
haps modeled roughly on clause (iii.) of (5) – of relative fundamentality among
kinds.
The questions I have raised about some of Bennett’s claims are at best start-
ing points for conversations about critical aspects of the phenomena associated
with building and fundamentality. And I have not touched on many of the
central themes of the book, which offer fruitful challenges to comfortable ortho-
doxies on many points. The book contains some real gems, including Bennett’s
development and defense of a kind of pluralism about both building and fun-
damentality (see n. 1 above, and §§2.5, 6.6) and her incisive discussion of the
idea of a natural property as developed by Lewis and Sider (§§5.8-5.9). At the
current stage of inquiry into the matters Bennett treats, the worth of a book
should be measured by the extent to which it advances debates and provides
promising new ideas for discussion. I fear that the critical cast of many of my
remarks above may obscure the extent to which her book succeeds admirably
on both scores. This book makes an important contribution, and should be
required reading for philosophers working in contemporary metaphysics.10
10Thanks to Karen Bennett, Mark Moyer, and Justin Zylstra for extensive assistance cor-
recting earlier drafts of this review.
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